In this article, the author provides a legal perspective on the interplay between social media use and employment. The unique characteristics of social media are identified in order to frame the article before a number of considerations with regard to employment relationships that impact on deciding social media misconduct cases are deliberated upon. Thereafter, the author reflects on the implications of social media transgressions for educators' professions and contemplates the forms that social media misconduct by South African educators can take, with specific focus on defamation. Before the article reaches its conclusion, social media evidence and the impact of the unique characteristics of social media on users' legitimate expectations of privacy are also considered. The article concludes with a few guidelines on how educators can avoid the pitfalls that make social media use potentially hazardous to their employment.
Introduction
Educators may labour under the misconception that their social network sites are personal and private and have nothing to do with their employers. They may feel secure in the protection offered by the divide between work and personal life and in their rights to privacy and freedom of expression. However, instances of unprofessional conduct and misconduct by educators -both of these in connection with their social media use -are on the rise.
Reference is made to a few of the substantial number of American cases involving educators and social media. The first is Munroe v Central Bucks School District, 1 which deals with an English educator who was dismissed for posting offensive comments about her learners and their parents on her blog. Her blog had only nine subscribers -all of them close friends -and did not include personal information such as her surname, workplace or address. The blog was not password protected, however, and learners succeeded in uncovering her identity. In blog entries posted while she was at work doing score cards she stated that, if she had to be truthful, she would have described the respective learners as a "complete and utter jerk in all waysʺ, a ʺlazy assholeʺ, a ʺdunderheadʺ, an ʺA.I.R.H.E.A.D.ʺ, ʺrat-likeʺ, and a ʺwhiny, simpering grade-grubber with an unrealistically high perception of own ability levelʺ. She also blogged that the parents of her learners were ʺbreeding a disgusting brood of insolent, unappreciative, selfish bratsʺ.
Land v L'Anse Creuse Public School Board of Education
deals with an educator who was fired after photographs, taken in 2005 during a combined bachelor/bachelorette party, surfaced on social media. In the photographs she is shown engaged in a simulated act of fellatio with a male mannequin. She was dismissed for engaging in lewd behaviour contrary to the moral values of the educational and school community, which undermined her moral authority and professional responsibilities as a role model for students.
The State Tenure Commission overturned the court a quo's decision, indicating that dismissal can be justified only by a finding of professional misconduct in instances where the misconduct has directly involved learners. The Michigan Appeal court upheld the commission's decision. A case dealing with unprofessional conduct involving learners is Spanierman v Hughes. It deals with an educator who created a MySpace account to which he invited his learners. The communication on the account was deemed unprofessional because he communicated with his learners in a ʺpeer-like fashionʺ, their banter included sexual innuendos and he posted photos of naked men. The educator voluntarily closed his account but went on to create a new account where he continued his unprofessional conduct. His contract was not renewed and the reason given was the disruptive effect that his mySpace account had had on the learning environment. 3 In State of Wisconsin v Ebersold, 4 an educator who sent sexually explicit messages to a learner in an internet chat room was dismissed on the grounds that he had ʺverbally communicated a harmful description or narrative account to a child, contrary to WIS STAT § 948.11(2)(am) (2005-06)ʺ. The educator appealed his conviction, arguing that sending messages via a chatroom does not constitute verbal communication and that the Statute thus does not apply. The court disagreed.
In South Africa an employee who posted a photo of and made statements about a co-employee on Facebook was found guilty of overtly offensive behaviour during the resulting disciplinary hearing. At arbitration the finding was declared substantively and procedurally unfair, but by then the employee had already resigned and her chances of future employment had been negatively affected. 5 The last case referred to here is that of a lecturer at the University of Cape Town who is under investigation after making a Facebook post that the university described as ʺgrave‚ unacceptable and disturbingʺ and as being in conflict with the university's values. According to a news report, the lecturer posted that ʺthe #MenAreTrash movement is ʹbullsh*tʹ and that women simply cannot attract quality menʺ. The same lecturer posted that, while suffering from depression, he had considered raping and killing his two-year-old daughter. It is evident that when social media are used indiscriminately, this can have serious employment implications for educators. In this article the author provides a legal perspective on the interplay between social media use and employment. She then draws lessons from this for South African educators on avoiding unprofessional social media conduct and social media misconduct. To frame this article, the unique characteristics of social media are discussed first.
Unique characteristics of social media
Before looking at the unique characteristics of social media that can make the use thereof hazardous to educators' employment, it is necessary to define ʺsocial mediaʺ. ʺSocial mediaʺ are forms of electronic communication (such as websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other content (such as videos The third characteristic of social media is the limited control that it allows users over their online identities. This sense of ʺüber-connectivityʺ gives employees a false sense of attachment, control and empowerment. 20 Finding an audience tends to strengthen deindividuation, that is, losing oneself in the group, finding strength in the group, and forming a ʺtoxic disinhibitionʺ. 21 Because social media act as echo chambers in which people can find confirmation of their views, users feel safe to use them to spread hate or false rumours, or to solicit support. 22 Lam 23 warns that, what an employee regards as voicing an opinion or complaint about work, the employer may regard as a threat to the reputation of the business.
The fourth characteristic is the limited control that social media allow users over their online identities. By creating a profile, one inadvertently shares personal information. Not only is a person's online identity created by the person's profile, but also by the digital footprint created by the information posted, ʺlikedʺ or ʺsharedʺ, the groups the person associates with, and the persons he or she befriends. Even the comments other users leave on a person's Facebook site and the photos a person is tagged in become ʺtestimonialsʺ to a person's online identity. 24 It should be kept in mind that social media networks generate revenue through exposure, especially by allowing marketing companies to use information not protected by privacy settings. It is thus unlikely that networks will have social media users' best interests in mind when the disclosure of personal information is at stake, because a lack of privacy settings means higher rates of exposure and higher revenue. 25 The fact that social media sites are public spaces which lack information security and confidentiality is the fifth characteristic that can make social media use hazardous to educators' employment. (22) 9 by arguing that the dishonesty has made the employment relationship intolerable. 42 The third consideration is the common law burden placed on employers by their liability for the delicts of their employees. 43 If discrimination, hate speech, harassment, violation of privacy or defamation via social media occurred ʺduring the course and scope of employmentʺ, the employer can be held vicariously liable. 44 Employers can be held vicariously liable even in instances where the wrongful conduct took place outside the workplace if ʺobjectively there is a sufficiently close link between the employee's act and the purposes and business of the employerʺ. 45 The heads of the provincial departments of basic education are the employers of public school educators appointed in the so-called subsidised posts. 46 This means the state can be held vicariously liable for the wrongful conduct of these educators, not only in terms of common law, but also in terms of section 60(1)(a) of the South African Schools Act 84 of 1996. This section provides for statutory state vicarious liability with regard to public schools and stipulates that the state can be held vicariously liable for any delictual or contractual damage or loss caused as a result of any act or omission in connection with any school activity conducted by a public school.
State vicarious liability also applies with regard to educators appointed in terms of section 20(4) of the Schools Act who are in the employ of the school. 47 It will not apply in relation to wrongful conduct which is not within the scope of employment or related to school activities. However, common law vicarious liability (as extended by the Constitutional Court) may apply in such instances. 48 There is also the argument that should the social media misconduct include, on the part of the department or school as organs of Bascerano, 53 argue that employers should be regarded as ʺresponsible partiesʺ in terms of section 1 of this Act because employers determine the purpose of and means for the processing of the personal information of data subjects. As ʺresponsible partiesʺ employers can be held accountable for their employees' unlawful processing of personal information. Millard and Bascerano 54 contend that section 9(2) of this Act limits defences that employers can bring against statutory vicarious liability for delicts committed by their employees. They state that neither ʺgood deedsʺ, ʺpro-activenessʺ nor ʺwrongful conduct not occurring while the employee was at workʺ will suffice as a defence.
The last consideration is that employees' conduct may not negatively impact on employers' legitimate business interests. 55 Employers may be justified in limiting employees' right to freedom of expression when using the work's equipment. The use of the employer's computer after hours, irrespective of where this is done, is still regulated by the employer's policies. (22) 11 to the within the scope of employment test). The commissioner concluded that the conversations clearly constituted sexual harassment and impacted on the relevant parties' work relationship. 56 In an Australian case, Griffiths v Rose, the employee watched pornography on the employer's computer after hours using his own internet connection. In this case the court emphasised that since the employer used the company's computer, the company, as the owner, could prescribe how it might be used. 57
Employers' legitimate business interests also give them a legitimate right to extract productivity from their employees and to protect resources. 58 The excessive use of social media during working hours (for non-employment purposes) could constitute misconduct because it hampers employees' productivity and affects infrastructure costs negatively. 59 Social media use can attract spam. Spam can entice employees to stay online longer at the expense of the employer with a loss of productivity and the possibility that it could slow the network down, resulting in clogging, or even cause a network crash. 60 A further business interest is found in the security risks such as viruses that internet-use holds and which could result in the loss of confidential information. 61 Due to the nature of social media, by posting information about work an employee runs the risk of inadvertently disclosing sensitive or confidential information which could be very damaging to the employer. 62
Educator professionalism and social media-related unprofessional conduct
Educators represent their employer as well as the schools at which they work and the profession. The consequences for educators of their inappropriate use of social media are complex, due to the standard of professionalism educators are held to. 66 During the first phase of their two-phase-study amongst first-year teacher education students at an American university, conducted before the participants were put through a process of professionalisation, Kimmons and Veletsianos 67 found that most of the participants did not appreciate the impact that their current social media conduct could have on their future professional identities. At that stage the participants regarded only content related to illegal actions such as underage drinking and drug use as unprofessional content to be avoided when using social media. Kimmons and Veletsianos 68 concluded [t] he reality of the situation, though, is that teachers cannot afford to lead the same lives that many other professionals can, and teacher education students only begin to realize this as they go through the process of professionalization.
Thus, by the time educators enter the profession they have already created online personae that may pose a danger to their professional reputations. 69 After the professionalisation process, participants in the study conducted by Kimmons and Veletsianos 70 described being subjected to a high professional standard as a necessary sacrifice because educators work with and are role models to children. Also Akiti, and Beckmann and Füssel, 71 observe that educators' professionalism and the expectations in relation to the fact that they work with children and are role models to children are It is trite that in terms of the principle imperitia culpae adnumeratur that a unique expertise or professionalism will impact on the standard of reasonableness expected of persons exercising that skill or members of a particular profession. 74 Thus when determining whether an educator has committed a delict, the standard of reasonableness used will be that of a professional educator working with children and being a role model to those children.
South African educators' use of social media must be within the bounds of the SACE Code of Professional Ethics. Failure to adhere to it could result in an educator's being found in breach of this Code and deregistered. 75 Educators have the obligation to create, observe and keep intact professional boundaries so that they do not abuse the position of power which they acquire as a result of their professional status. They must regard teaching as a ʺnoble callingʺ, ʺact in accordance with the ideals of their professionʺ and not ʺbring the teaching profession into disreputeʺ. 76 In addition to this general ethical principle, which will most probably always come into play in social media misconduct cases, several other ethical principles contained in the SACE Code of professional ethics can also be breached by inappropriate social media use. These include  using proper procedures to address issues of professional incompetence or misbehaviour, for example by not making public disclosures about such issues on social media;
 promoting a harmonious relationship with parents, for example by not posting offensive comments about parents;
 using appropriate language and behaviour when interacting with colleagues, for example by not posting racist or sexist comments;
 avoiding humiliating or abusing colleagues or learners, for example by not using social media to sexually harass colleagues or to groom learners;
 serving the employer to the best of the educator's ability, for example by not using social media for non-work related activities during working hours; and  refraining from discussing confidential and official matters with unauthorised persons, for example by not discussing learners' disciplinary matters, performance or HIV/AIDS status or the school's financial matters on social media sites. 77
Unprofessional conduct will in most cases also constitute misconduct and, in some cases even a civil or criminal offence. It should be kept in mind that the unprofessional conduct will be dealt with by SACE and the misconduct by the employer. 78 Social media defamation may constitute misconduct in the form of unfair discrimination, where the defaming words unfairly discriminate on any of the grounds listed in section 9 of the Constitution and section 18(1)(k) of the Employment of Educators Act 76 of 1998 or analogous grounds. 81 The use of social media may also constitute misconduct if an educator:
Educator social media misconduct
 ʺwithout permission wrongfully … uses the property of the State, a school…ʺ;
 ʺwhile on duty, conducts himself or herself in an improper, disgraceful or unacceptable mannerʺ;
 ʺdisplays disrespect towards others in the workplace or demonstrates abusive or insolent behaviourʺ;
 ʺintimidates or victimises fellow employees, learners or studentsʺ;
 ʺcommits a common law offenceʺ. 82 Common law offences will include violations of personality interests such as a person's good name or reputation (defamation), dignity (insult) and privacy (disclosure of private facts).
Defamation as social media misconduct
Unprofessional conduct will in most cases also constitute misconduct and in some cases even a civil or criminal offence. Neethling 83 emphasises that, because Facebook is in the public domain, posting private information about others will constitute a prima facie violation of privacy. If the post is also inappropriate and offensive, the post will be prima facie wrongful. cannot be justified, the actio iniuriarum could be used to claim satisfaction for the injury caused by way of damages. 84 Due to the nature of social media, a presumption of publication is created as soon as a comment is posted on the internet. 85 It is highly unlikely that this presumption will be rebutted, because publication is probable. 86 Once the defendant has established that a defamatory statement was published and the defendant was responsible for the publication, a further presumption is created that the statement was unlawful and intentional. The publisher of the statement must then rebut the presumption by proving that the statement is true and in the public interest or benefit, or constitutes fair comment. 87 With regard to the defence of truth and of being in the public interest, Willis J emphasises in H v W 88
In our law, it is not good enough, as a defence to or ground of justification for a defamation, that the published words may be true: it must also be to the public benefit or in the public interest that they be published. A distinction must always be kept between what 'is interesting to the public' as opposed to 'what it is in the public interest to make known'.
It may be wise to note that how the inappropriate comments are phrased will affect whether they are regarded as fair comment or not. There are many points of production or possible creators. 92 Davey states that everyone in the chain of publication and who has contributed to the publication of the defamatory statement is liable. 93 One can be held liable for third-party defamatory comments on one's social media site. In Pritchard v Van Nes the Supreme Court of British Columbia considered liability for third-party defamatory comments which hinted at the fact that a specific music teacher was a paedophile. Saunders J identified three modes of defamation present in that case: the defendant's own defamatory innuendos posted on her Facebook page, the republication of these remarks by others, and then the defamatory remarks made in response to the defendant's posts. 94 The judge applied the three exceptions (as identified by Brown in The Law of Defamation in Canada 1994) to the rule that a person can be liable for his or her own defamatory publications only. Where the information republished is the same or substantially the same as the original, a person can be held liable for third party defamatory comments if (1) the defendant intended or has authorised others to publish defamatory comments on his or her behalf, (2) the defendant published the defamatory comments to a person who is under a moral, legal or social duty to repeat the comments to another person and (3) the responsive remarks were the natural and probable result of his or her publication. 95 The principle that a non-creator of offensive posts can be held liable was confirmed in Dutch Reformed Church Vergesig vs Rayan Sooknunan. 96 This case deals with an application by the Church for an order interdicting Sooknunan/GDWM from publishing certain harmful allegations and comments. Sooknunan (or GDWM) was found to be the creator of the Facebook page and to have allowed harmful comments to be posted on it. The reasoning behind the principle that a person can be held liable for what a third party has posted on his or her social media sites is that if one creates the opportunity (space) for unlawful content to be published, one will be regarded as the publisher and will be held responsible for the content of that space/pages. 97 This is especially important for those who create blogs or discussion forums. In Isparta v Richter, the second defendant did not post any comments but was tagged in the first defendant's posts. 102 One aspect that will render the employer identifiable is when the employer or place of employment are identified on the employee's social media profile. If an employee has identified either his or her employer or place of employment on his or her social media profile, and especially if access to the site is not restricted, it will be almost impossible to rely on the fact that the employer or place of work was not mentioned in the defamatory post. 103 If an employee has co-employees as social media friends, enough information may exist, even though not mentioned on the social media site, that may make the institution, department or co-employee recognisable to these friends. 104 Douglas 105 argues that, because of the sharing function, defamation by social media has the potential to be more damaging than other comparable defamatory matter and could equally draw higher awards of damages. This is because the inappropriate post can be seen by more people and be shared out of context.
Failing to comply with an order to remove offending posts may result in a court order to submit the digital devices so that a sheriff of the court can remove them. In KS v AM 106 Molahlehi J ordered the respondent to hand the digital devices under his control to the Sheriff of the Court for temporary custody so that a forensic expert could identify and permanently remove any photograph, video, audio and or records relating to the applicant. Where the offender is in control of private material in relation to the victim (such as naked photos), continuous violations of the victim's rights to dignity, privacy, bodily and psychological integrity are possible as long as the offender retains such control. Constitutional imperatives call for protecting the victim against future rights violations. As was held in National Director of Public Prosecutions v Mahomed 107 the right to privacy is violated also by dispossessing a person of material that he or she is entitled to hold in private. The violation occurs when and for as long as the dispossession of control over the private material continues.
Social media evidence
Social media evidence can be the basis of the transgression itself, for example defamatory comments posted on Facebook, or it can be evidence of a transgression that was not committed via social media. 108 There are ample examples of the latter. Co-employees made copies of an employee's Facebook posts including photographs of her on the beach and messages about the lovely time she was having in Chatfield v Deputy Head (Correctional Service Canada). The posts evidenced that the employee was on holiday instead of on the bereavement leave for which she had applied. 109 Another example is the case of Zungu / Department of Education -KwaZuluNatal, in which posts from a learner's Facebook page were used as evidence to indicate a relationship between the educator and the learner. 110
Social media symbols such as the ʺthumbs up-sign" and emoticons are used as evidence. In Dagane v SSSBC 119 the applicant argued that he did not make the posts concerned and that either somebody else had accessed his account and made the racist posts or had created another account using his details and photos. The commissioner concluded that the applicant's argument was far-fetched and found the supporting evidence in the fact that the applicant had restricted access to his Facebook page, had not given his password to anybody and, after he had closed his Facebook account, no account in his name had existed. The commissioner further stated that if somebody else had made the posts, the applicant would have distanced himself from having made the remarks, but he had not.
Swales 120 and Fourie 121 contend that social media evidence can be either documentary hearsay evidence or real evidence (automated or mechanically created with no human intervention). The purpose of presenting the evidence will determine whether the evidence is documentary or real. Where a document is presented as evidence that the document exists or was sent to a specific person it will constitute real and not documentary evidence and will not be treated as hearsay evidence. 122 In Dagane v SSSBC, the case of a former policeman who posted racist comments on the Facebook page of Mr Julius Malema, Steenkamp J held that Facebook postings are hearsay evidence which is inadmissible but that, like all hearsay evidence, they may be found admissible in terms of section 3(c) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act 16 of 1988. 123 Frieden and Murray considered the American Federal Rules of Evidence and concluded that chatroom transcripts can be authenticated by evidence that the alleged sender had access to the computer, was active in the chat room when the relevant chats were posted, had created the screen name under which the chats were posted, and had admitted to having conducted 118 ELRC 2018 http://www.elrc.org.za/awards/case-no-elrc97-1617gp para 61. Nel 125 suggests that when a user receives a complaint about an offending post, he or she should remove the post and offer a prompt, unreserved apology in the same medium and with the same prominence as the original post. However, Douglas 126 asserts that removing a post does not guarantee that no future damage may result from the post because the internet allows almost endless replication. Somebody else could have already copied, forwarded or shared a post before it was removed. He states: ʺthe potential for a defamatory accusation to re-emerge in the future -a potential that can be realised by the operation of the grapevine effect -justifies an award of damages to vindicate the plaintiff's reputationʺ. 127
Educators' right to privacy and obtaining digital footprint evidence
The test to determine whether there is a legitimate expectation of privacy, as set out in Bernstein v Bester, 128 consists of two questions, namely whether the person has a subjective right to privacy and whether society has recognised such an expectation as objectively reasonable. Judge Ackerman held that to determine ʺwhether the individual has lost his/her legitimate expectation of privacy, the court will consider such factors as whether the item was exposed to the public, abandoned, or obtained by consentʺ. When one posts a non-work related post on business social media sites, one has no expectation of privacy. An employee of Chrysler was dismissed after he mistakenly posted a tweet that included a swear word on the business's twitter account instead of on his own account. 137 An expectation of privacy in the truly personal realm will be more likely to be regarded as Medical and Dental Council, 140 indicated that the following factors should be considered in determining the invasion of the right to information privacy: a) whether the information was obtained in an intrusive manner; b) whether it was about intimate aspects of the applicant's personal life (thus how great was the expectation of privacy with regard to the information); c) whether it involved data provided by the applicant for one purpose but which was used for a different purpose; d) whether the information was disseminated to the press or the general public or persons from whom the applicant could reasonably expect such private information would be withheld.
Equally, these factors apply in instances where an employer has accessed an employee's social media sites without permission. It is also a criminal offence to intentionally access or intercept data without authority or permission. 141 Note, however, that Plasket J held in Harvey v Niland 142 that the fact that this is a criminal offence does not mean that the evidence obtained in this manner is inadmissible. This Act is silent on whether evidence obtained in contravention of this section is inadmissible. Thus, in civil cases such as defamation cases, the fact that the employer has obtained evidence in an unlawful manner from one's social media site may not automatically make such evidence inadmissible. Fourie 143 contends that social media evidence will still be subject to the rules of relevance and authenticity, as well as the other exclusionary rules of evidence, before it may be admitted. He further argues that printouts or transcripts of social media evidence will be the best form in which to present the evidence. The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 145 defines ʺdata messageʺ as ʺdata generated, sent, received or stored by electronic meansʺ which can include electronic information generated via social media. 146 The Act stipulates that the following aspects must be considered when assessing the evidential weight of a data message:
(a) the reliability of the manner in which the data message was generated, stored or communicated;
(b) the reliability of the manner in which the integrity of the data message was maintained;
(c) the manner in which its originator was identified.
Conclusion
Not considering the unique characteristics of social media can be hazardous to educators' employment, especially in the light of accepted legal principles regulating the employment relationship. The unique nature of social media will inter alia affect users' control over their audiences, their expectations of privacy and the way they exercise their right to freedom of expression.
Several considerations with regard to employment relations impact on social media misconduct. Social media posts that blemish the reputation of the state, employer or school; that bring the profession into disrepute; that affect the trust relationship; that may result in the state's or the employer's being held vicariously liable (either in terms of common law or statutory provisions) and which may result in the legitimate interests of the state, employer or school being negatively affected, can draw dismissal. The consequences for educators of their inappropriate use of social media are complex, because they are held to a high moral and professionalism standard. This high standard is grounded in the fact that educators work with children and have to act as role models to them. Educators' unique professionalism and the statutory state liability supports a ʺstricterʺ response to social media misconduct than would be the case for employees in general.
Though existing law and policy cover social media misconduct and social media-related unprofessional conduct sufficiently, the misuse of social media creates unique dangers. For example, educators may think that what they post will be viewed by only those to whom they have granted viewing rights. However, employers can gain access to such posts through the accounts of others whom the educator has befriended. They may befriend a colleague with whom they would not have had any social relationship in real life, but because of the social media friendship they will develop a false sense of camaraderie and familiarity in relation to the colleague. They can develop a false sense of control, attachment and empowerment and think that they can use social media to rally support from ʺlike-mindedʺ people, but in the process they can injure the reputation of their employer, school or profession. The social media allow for multiple creators of a communication, and the owner of the social media account can be held liable for any offending posts made by others on his or her site. Liability attaches not only to the original publication, but also to re-publication and to responses to the publication. Furthermore, due to the unique nature of social media, the damage that may result from an offending post has the prospect of increasing in severity over time.
As professionals, educators should keep in mind that  they are held to a high standard of professionalism because they work with and have to be role models to children. Online personae have a definite impact on educators' professional image, the profession and also the reputation and image of the employer (department) and the school;  social media sites are public spaces, and whether access to a social media account is restricted or not impacts on the level of the legitimate expectation of privacy a user has. Not protecting an account by means of a password, allowing friends-of-friends access and having a high number of friends limit the legitimate expectation of privacy. There is no legitimate expectation of privacy with regard to some social media sites, such as Twitter. Using privacy settings has two benefits: it protects privacy better and, should a comment be posted that someone else regards as inappropriate, the court will regard the harm as less serious than it would have, had privacy settings not been in place;
 it is essential to regularly access one's own social media accounts and to monitor the posts that others make on one's sites. Should a third party make a post or posts that might constitute hate speech or harassment, or that is pornographic or defamatory in nature, one Ltd v Eisenberg 2016 ZAFSHC 200 (20 October 2016 
